This paper discusses the impact on research quality of New Zealand universities of the Performance-Based Research Fund from 2003 to 2012. This is a peer-review process involving assessment of individual researchers. The contribution to improvement in research quality arising from transitions among research quality categories and entrants and exits of individuals are identified. A substantial component of change has been the removal of non-research active staff. There has been population ageing due to retention of older and higher-quality researchers and a large reduction in the number of younger researchers. Significant differences among universities are evident in the patterns of transformation. The paper also critically considers the PBRF assessment process and characteristics of the metrics used, suggesting scope for improvement in the assessment of researchers and the way in which universities are ranked.
Introduction
The Performance-based Research Fund (PBRF) was introduced in New Zealand in 2003 as a method of allocating research funding to tertiary education organisations on the basis of research performance, rather than the number of students. 1 This is part of a world-wide emergence of performance-based evaluation schemes designed to underpin funding of tertiary institutions; see Coryn (2007) , OECD (2010), Jones and Cleere (2014) , de Boer et al (2015) , and Wilsdon, et al (2015) . Similar schemes were introduced earlier in the United Kingdom, Australia and Hong Kong, and subsequently in Denmark, Norway and Sweden and in other countries. 2 These schemes vary by coverage and assessment method, which may be bibliometric or peer-review based. The New Zealand scheme uses a peerreview assessment method and assesses individuals rather than groups. 3 The Tertiary Education Commission explained the aims of the PBRF process as follows:
'The primary purpose of the Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) is to ensure that excellent research in the tertiary education sector is encouraged and rewarded. This entails assessing the research performance of tertiary education organisations (TEOs) and then funding them on the basis of their performance '. 4 The purpose of this paper is to contribute to understanding the potential effects of these schemes by summarising the results of a research programme analysing the impact on universities of the New Zealand PBRF scheme. The results can contribute towards the wider debate on performance-based schemes for which, as de Boer et al. (2015, p.5) conclude, 'there still is not sufficient evidence on the effects of the systems and ... our 1 For background and detailed discussion of the PBRF, see New Zealand Tertiary Education Commission (2002, 2013) and Ministry of Education (2012). 2 See also Ministry of Education (2013) for a comparison of the New Zealand scheme with other schemes, and Roberts (2005) on the Australian scheme. 3 In their summary of the literature regarding research evaluation and metrics, Wilsden, et al (2015, p. viii) argue that, 'Peer review is not perfect, but it is the least worst form of academic governance we have.' An example of how the use of bibliographic metrics can affect research evaluation results in the context of the PBRF is provided by Tressler and Anderson (2012, p. 17 ) who conclude 'that the timelags between publication and citation make it difficult to rely on citation counts to produce a meaningful measure of output in a PBRF-like research-evaluation framework, especially one based on the assessment of individual academics'. See Davidson (2013) for a different perspective in the context of the Australian ERA system. 4 See http://www.tec.govt.nz/funding/funding-and-performance/funding/fund-finder/performance-basedresearch-fund/.
understanding of the proper design and implementation of performance agreements is still incomplete'.
The PBRF has changed the incentives facing universities and individual researchers. It is important to examine both the nature of those incentives and their potential effects.
Improvement in a university's research quality -assessed as some form of average of individual researcher qualities -can come about for three reasons. First, changes arise from recruitment and retention of high-quality staff; second, from encouraging the exit of lower-quality staff; and third, from converting low-quality to high-quality researchers.
Each of these paths has different 'effective prices' and faces various constraints. The speed of transformation is affected by the supply of high-quality researchers and the form of university contracts, including the flexibility in pay scales. The effective prices and constraints are likely to differ among universities. It is neither feasible nor desirable to have a university consisting only of researchers judged by the PBRF process to be of the highest quality at a given date: the balance between high-quality and low-quality researchers is also likely to vary between universities. This paper explores the possible implications of PBRF by examining the nature of the relevant flows and their contribution to changes in NZ universities' average research quality.
Others have endeavoured to assess the impact of PBRF by comparing publication measures before and after the introduction of PBRF. 5 However, no previous work has utilised the data on individual researcher performance produced by the PBRF process itself. The insights summarised in this paper are derived using a database consisting of an 
Key features of the PBRF process
The maximum individual score is therefore 700. A letter grade, indicating the quality category, is then assigned depending on the assessed total. These are as follows: R for scores 0 to 199; C for scores between 200 and 399; B for scores from 400 to 599; and A for scores from 600 to 700. 9 A numerical score, G, is then assigned to each letter grade: 10 for an A; 6 for a B; 2 for a C; and 0 for R. 10 These categories are described further in Ministry of Education (2012, p. 21) . When individuals move between institutions, all their quality score goes to the new institution, irrespective of how long they have been at the new university and how much has been invested in them by the previous employer. 11 Another factor influencing the change in the number of researchers assessed was the change in 2012 to the process. In the 2003 and 2006 PBRF rounds, all eligible staff were assigned a quality category and if an evidence portfolio was not submitted the staff member was assigned a quality category of R. 13 At a late stage in the 2012 process, TEC changed the rules such that only submitted portfolios were assigned a quality category.
Changes in the number of researchers assessed by PBRF
Hence universities could choose not to submit portfolios for those who were expected to be assigned a quality category of R. This affected the calculation of AQSs, as discussed further below. 12 The staff numbers for the Universities of Auckland, Canterbury, Otago and Victoria University of Wellington used in this paper include the staff from these respective Colleges of Education. 13 However, in 2006, those who submitted a portfolio in 2003 did not need to submit a new one if they took the view that their quality category had not changed. In those cases, they were assigned their 2003 category. The TEC publishes aggregate university data on an employment-weighted basis, shown in portfolios, which translated to 1152.5 using employment weights; this implies an overall weight of 0.69, which increased to 0.87 by 2012. The ratio for all universities combined increased from 0.61 to 0.89. This general increase, which occurred at the same time as the total number of evidence portfolios declined, reflects the reduction in the proportion of part-time researchers. particularly AUT for which the increase was three-fold. The rise in the ratio of employment-weighted portfolios to total employment-weighted non-administration staff implies that universities reduced the proportion of non-administration staff who were not research active. 15
Figure 1 Average Full-Time Equivalent Researchers

Figure 2 Ratio of FTE Evidence Portfolios to Total Number of Staff
Changes in average quality scores for New Zealand universities
This section reports changes between 2003 to 2012 in the average quality scores, AQSs, of the eight universities, derived as follows. Define the employment weight of person i as 1, and let n denote the relevant number of employees in a university. 16 The choice of n has an important effect and is discussed in more detail below. The AQS is:
As explained in Section 2, the value for each researcher, G, ranges from zero to 10, depending on the individual's quality category. Hence, a university's AQS can range from zero to 10. 17
The Tertiary Education Commission produced a range of AQS measures, depending on the choice of denominator. One measure uses the employment-weighted total of all researchers for whom PBRF portfolios were submitted, while another measure excludes R-type researchers. Since the grade for R-type staff is equal to zero, their inclusion affects only the denominator in (2). The change in the rules in 2012, which allowed universities to withhold submission of the portfolios of potential R-type researchers, means that the AQSs published by the Tertiary Education Commission for 2012 are not necessarily comparable with those for 2003. 18
However, an alternative preferred measure can be derived by using the total number of non-administration staff as the denominator in equation (2). The use of this denominator avoids the problems of comparability mentioned in the previous paragraph. An AQS based on all non-administrative staff can be obtained by multiplying the AQS which includes all portfolios, including R-researchers and based on the unweighted TEC data, by the ratio of the employment-weighted number of portfolios to the total number of nonadministrative staff. The latter ratio is obtained from the published data in Table 2 . The details of this calculation are explained in Buckle and Creedy (2018) . 19 Table 3 shows AQSs derived on this basis for each university and all universities combined, and indicates that all universities have improved. 20 However, there are substantial differences in the rates of improvement across the eight universities. The proportional growth rates for each university are shown in Table 4 . The final row of this table shows the extent to which the growth in each AQS exceeds that which would arise in a scoring system under which all non-R researchers are given the same score. It can be seen that, for all universities combined, the change in the distribution of C, B and A researchers has contributed only an additional 9 per cent to the growth of the AQS. This of research quality. The term 'Average Quality Score', is not in fact an average of scores, but is a weighted average of the values attached to individual quality categories, where the latter are determined by the individual's position in the distribution of Total Weighted Scores.
appears to suggest that there has been little overall improvement over and above the removal of a large number of non-research-active staff. The question arises of whether the changes exhibit convergence, implying an inverse relationship between the proportional improvement of AQSs and initial AQSs. Table 4 arranges universities from left to right from the lowest to highest AQS in 2003.
Convergence is consistent with growth rates decreasing from left to right. AUT has the It also seems that of those classed as C-researchers in 2003, a high proportion, 46 per cent, had exited by 2012. It is likely that many of these moves were to another university, and may have involved some kind of promotion, but this information is not available from the data. The B-researchers also experienced substantial outward mobility, and 29 per cent of those who were A in 2003 had exited. This is consistent with a small proportion of entrants over the period being classed as A-researchers in 2012. There can be a large proportion of As who left between 2003 and 2012, since the denominator (initial number of As) is much smaller than the total number of entrants in all categories over the period.
Patterns of change in research quality of NZ universities
Individual university responses
This section examines the extent of heterogeneity among universities in their recruitment and transitions. These results reported in Section 5 suggest that the conversion of Bs and Cs to higher grades is less 'costly' than that of Rs. The relative ability to recruit higher quality researchers and retain high quality researchers may vary across university.
23 It has been noted that in 2006, a distinction was made between 'new and emerging' (NE) for C and R staff. The effect of the NE category on upward movement was examined using matrices of transitions between 2006 and 2012. The distinction in the case of Cs appears to have had little value. But in the case of R researchers, those who were NE in 2006 experienced much more upward movement than other Rs. This suggest that the PBRF encouraged more careful selection of entry-level researchers.
Universities were incentivised to recruit at the higher levels and appoint very few researchers with low research outputs. However, the incentives vary among universities depending on their initial AQS. For example, it can be shown that the proportional increase in the AQS of a university with n researchers (assuming these are all full-time employees), resulting from hiring one additional type-A researcher, is given by: To illustrate the varying responses, Table 6 Table 5 . 24
Figure 3 Effects on AQS of Varying Quality Categories
As anticipated, the transition proportions clearly differ among universities. The only universities whose transitions do not differ significantly from those of all universities combined are Massey and Auckland. The university that differs most from the average is VUW, which had the highest AQS in 2012. The next-highest chi-square value is for AUT, which had the highest percentage change in its AQS over the period. While AUT and VUW differ most from the overall pattern, they also differ from each other considerably. Inspection of Table 6 reveals that the universities differ from each other in different ways. 26 As suggested by Figure 3 , changes evident in the universities with a lower initial AQS differ from those with a higher initial AQS. Thus AUT, which had the lowest initial AQS, recruited relatively few A and B researchers and converted few people to higher grades. It was relatively strong in recruiting Cs and achieving a high number of exits from
Rs, but it also recruited more Rs than average. Lincoln also recruited relatively more Cs and Rs, but was about average in its ability to convert researchers to higher grades and achieving exits of Rs. Massey also recruited relatively more Cs, was quite successful at converting Rs to Cs, and in achieving exits of Rs.
Thus, the experience differed among the three universities that were consistently ranked at the low end of the AQSs. The common features for this group are the low recruitment of As and Bs, and their reliance on recruiting Rs, with improvements coming from recruiting relatively more Cs and getting high exits among Rs. Conversion rates were also low, with the exception of Massey regarding Rs. It could be argued that these universities face relatively high effective costs of recruiting As and Bs. Nevertheless, these universities managed to retain relatively more of their higher-scoring researchers.
Auckland was strong at recruiting As, but were in other respects similar to the pattern revealed by all universities combined. Canterbury recruited relatively more Bs, but at the same time suffered more than average exits of A and B researchers. It was also successful at converting Rs to Cs. Otago recruited relatively few Rs and had higher exits of Rs, while being strong at recruiting Bs. Nevertheless, it was about average at converting researchers to higher-scoring academics. Waikato had a relatively strong conversion of Rs to Cs and were stronger at appointing Bs, while achieving fewer exits of Rs.
At the top of the AQS ranking in 2012, VUW achieved success at appointing As and Bs, and keeping its higher-scoring staff. In addition, it appointed relatively fewer Cs and Rs. Unusually, it had success in converting Rs to B researchers. Among the top five universities, Canterbury stands out in terms of its ability to appoint from people who were rated B researchers in 2012. Canterbury's higher losses of As and Bs may be explained to some extent by the earthquake experience, since those researchers are expected to be more mobile. The higher-ranked universities were also relatively better at converting researchers to higher grades, with the possible exception of Otago.
It might be argued that these higher-ranked universities have the kind of environment, including stronger academic leadership from A and B researchers, and perhaps also more resources devoted to internal research grants, which stimulate higher outputs. Also, in recruiting Rs, they may also be selecting from those who are at the higher end of the scale in terms of their potential. The greater ease of attracting As and Bs to the higher AQS universities, combined with the effect of the funding formula, may be said to involve an effective reduction in their 'price'.
One difficulty in interpreting the findings is that the analysis of transitions during which PBRF has operated does not have a control group with which to compare performance. 27
Hence, it is not obvious that all the changes can be attributed directly to the PBRF process.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that New Zealand universities in 2003 had a large number of Rs, and this was inconsistent with the incentive structure created by the PBRF exercise. This question can be formally assessed by considering the implied equilibrium distribution generated by the transitions and entries observed over the PBRF period, if they are held constant. After a sufficient time, the system would settle into an equilibrium distribution of academics across the quality categories: in this situation, outward movements from each category would be balanced by inward movements each period.
An equilibrium distribution derived by using the transition matrix and vector of births in Table 5 was found to give equilibrium stocks of each quality category that are not feasible and very different from the totals observed for 2012. 28 It is therefore not unreasonable to 27 Ideally, in order to isolate the effect of PBRF it would be necessary to compare the post-PBRF transitions with those that would have occurred in the absence of PBRF. This would require information about previous transitions, including the likely behaviour of those who may not have left the system in the absence of PBRF. In addition, there may have been other external influences, such as the effect of the global financial crisis on the ability of New Zealand universities to recruit academics from other countries, the effects of which cannot be isolated. 28 See Buckle and Creedy (2018) for further details.
suggest that the evolution of New Zealand universities since 2003 represents to some extent a structural shift in response to the introduction of PBRF, and this path cannot be expected to continue indefinitely. These results help to provide an indication of the extent to which the changes since 2003 are in fact large, despite the many characteristics of universities which make structural change difficult.
Changes in the age distribution of researchers
The desire to retain A and B researchers, who are typically relatively older, along with considerable caution in recruiting entry-level researchers, so that only those who have already displayed some publishing success are likely to be appointed to lectureships, suggests a tendency for population ageing in the NZ university system. The age of some researchers was not reported in the TEC dataset, and hence the sample size used to evaluate changes in the age distribution of researchers is smaller than that used in the other Sections. Nevertheless, Table 7 shows a marked change in the age distribution of researchers. Between 2003 and 2012, there were large declines in the number of researchers in each age group, except for the 60-89 group, with a 77.7 per cent growth rate. The largest absolute decline was in the 40-49 age group, which fell by 415 researchers (a decline of 18.2 per cent). But the largest percentage decline was in the 20-29 years age cohort which fell by 64.3 per cent. The changes shown in Table 7 may be associated with changes in the age distribution by grade. To compare the distributions, the observed proportions for 2003 were used to derive 'expected frequencies' for the 2012 age distribution by grade and 2012 grade distribution by age (using the absolute totals in 2012). The differences between the observed and expected frequencies for the 2012 age distribution by grade are shown in Table 8 : these may be referred to as 'unexpected changes'. 20 The sum of each column in Table 8 shows the differences for each age group between observed and expected frequencies; the sum of each row is zero. These totals reveal that the large increase in the frequency of researchers in the 60-89 age group is much higher (by 599.71) than could be expected from the 2003 marginal frequencies. Conversely, the decline in the frequency of researchers in each of the other age groups is larger than would be expected from the 2003 marginal frequencies. The largest differences are the decline of approximately 306 in the 40-49 age cohort, and the rise of approximately 600 older age cohort researchers. The unexpected high number of older people of R-quality may be because it is more difficult and expensive to remove people in the older age cohorts. 29 The 'excess' decline in lower-category researchers in the youngest age cohort may reflect the possibility that people in that stage of their careers are more career mobile or are easier to remove. 30
Assessment of PBRF appraisal method and metrics
Having examined some of the characteristic of changes in AQSs, it is useful to return to the choice of metric itself. A fundamental initial judgement required in any research quality appraisal involves the question of whether quality is perceived to be a continuous (or quasi-continuous) variable, or whether it is discrete, whereby individuals are placed into a small number of well-defined categories. The basic view of 'quality' has not been articulated by the Ministry of Education and the PBRF process involves what might be described as a hybrid (or perhaps ambivalent) method.
As explained in Section 2, each research portfolio is assigned an initial total weighted score by discipline experts, which is the sum of the weighted individual component scores for research output, peer esteem and contribution to research environment. These initial scores are subject to a further round of assessment, where adjustments may be made.
After this second round, the portfolio is then placed into one of four quality categories, R, C, B, and A.
The method used to derive total weighted scores, involving equation (1), has some properties which may not be immediately apparent. With three components sj, where j = 1, 2, 3, each is given an integer score from zero to seven, the total weighted score, S, can range from 0 to 700, but many values in the range are not possible. The number of possible values actually depends on the weights, qj, used to form the aggregate, . The number of permutations is 512. With PBRF weights of 0.7, 0.15 and 0.15, the possible values start from 0 and increase in increments of 15 until reaching 60. The next two numbers in the sequence are 70 and 75, after which they increase in increments of 5 up to 570. The next number is 580 and then the values increase in increments of 5 up to the maximum of 700.
Furthermore, the number of ways of achieving a given value of S varies with S itself. To give a few examples, there are two ways of obtaining a score of 15, but 5 ways of getting a score of 60, 6 ways of obtaining 345, 7 ways of getting a score of 90, and 8 ways of getting 315. This means that, if everyone has an equal independent probability of obtaining a score from 0 to 700 for each of the quality types, there is not an equal probability of falling into equal ranges of S. Buckle and Creedy (2017b) show that the scoring system can itself have a substantial effect on the measured quality distribution of researchers. Examination of the distribution of initial weighted scores in the 2003 and 2012 PBRF rounds, and movements in those scores during the expert panel assessments stages, indicates that the use of quality categories and associated thresholds appear to have influenced the performance scores assigned to research portfolios and the final allocation of portfolios to quality categories.
In particular, the process generated large spikes in the distribution of total weighted scores at the lower thresholds for each quality category. Furthermore, the distribution of scores is roughly symmetric. These features contrast strongly with the distribution of metrics used by other performance evaluation methods. Without a clear rationale for the use of quality categories and the selection of threshold values, the choice of weights, qj,, assigned to each component also appears arbitrary. Yet, these weights and the distribution of total weighted scores can affect the research quality ranking of universities and disciplines.
This raises questions as to whether the presence of threshold levels created by the use of quality categories, and the weights attached to each component, influence the decisions of peer reviewers and discipline expert panels in assigning preliminary scores and moving people to the next threshold. It also raises the possibility that the final distribution of total weighted scores has properties that differ from those which would emerge in a system using only an overall measure based on the distribution of weighted scores, S, for disciplines and universities, rather than the AQSs based on the weighted quality categories.
This system used by the Tertiary Education Commission to summarise research quality discards information about the relative quality of researcher portfolios which could be used to derive alternative summary measures of average university quality. 31 Furthermore, it is not possible to know what distribution of scores would have arisen without the reviewers' prior knowledge of the use of quality category thresholds. An alternative method, using quality categories, would involve the independent evaluation of scores, followed by the determination of thresholds. This is still subject to the criticism that the use of quality categories compresses all scores within a given range to a single value.
Considerable attention is given to the AQSs and resulting rankings, in view of the kind of reputation effects stressed by OECD (2010). Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction, funding is based on a formulae which uses individual quality categories, rather than AQSs, with funding weights that vary by discipline.
Conclusions
This paper has summarised the changes in NZ universities' measured research quality since the introduction of the PBRF scheme in 2003, which was designed to promote and reward research excellence in the tertiary education sector. The New Zealand scheme is particularly interesting because it uses a peer review system of assessment and assesses all eligible university staff.
The Rates of improvement also varied markedly amongst the top-ranked universities.
Consequently, there has not been a clear tendency for convergence to the mean level of A strong feature associated with the improvements in researcher quality has been a significant change in the age distribution of researchers. There was substantial population ageing over the period. This arose from a combination of an increase in the average age of entry and reduced exits from older age groups. This led to changes in the age distribution within quality category grades. The cost of recruiting younger researchers who do not progress to higher quality categories has increased with the introduction of PBRF. This incentive has indeed influenced recruitment, with a tendency to recruit mainly early career academics with clearer evidence of research capability. However, there has not been a relatively high rate of exit from older Rs, and this may be because of employment related constraints associated with tenure.
Without similar pre-PBRF data, it is not obvious that the observed changes can all be attributed to the introduction of the PBRF process. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the transformation that has taken place is not sustainable, in the sense that if the transition proportions remained constant over time, the equilibrium distributions of researchers would be unrealistic. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the large changes over the period 2003 to 2012 have, to a substantial degree, been stimulated by the introduction of the PBRF and that such large changes are unlikely to be repeated. The PBRF scoring system involves several stages of evaluation and weighting to derive each individual's quality category. This combines the use of an idiosyncratic quasicontinuous scoring system with the use of discrete quality categories. It reflects an ambivalence concerning the view taken of how research quality should be measured. The system could be significantly simplified given a clear judgment on this crucial issue. For example, if it is believed that research quality can only be classified into discrete broad categories, there would seem to be no role for a first stage derivation of a total weighted score for each person. On the other hand, if continuous variation over a wide quality range, reflected in many metrics of research quality, is believed to be appropriate, the PBRF scoring system could be considerably simplified and improved to reflect the kind of heterogeneity revealed in other metrics.
Where the PBRF process is used to rank universities in terms of research quality, there are no good reasons not to include, as denominator in the calculation of AQSs, the total number of non-administrative staff. 33 This is the denominator used in the present paper, although it has not been used by the Tertiary Education Commission (which excludes Rquality researchers) when publishing PBRF outcomes. In addition, the use of student numbers as one denominator has no clear rationale and the publication of AQSs on this basis has been subject to misinterpretation.
It is clear that an incentive structure involving some kind of assessment is needed to allocate public funds and to stimulate the adoption of appropriate policies by universities.
A challenge is to avoid unintended negative consequences. This paper has shown that the research quality of NZ universities has improved substantially and it can be argued that this is a direct result of the introduction of the PBRF system. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded unambiguously that universities have been appropriately rewarded for their improvements or that the procedures and metrics used are ideal. Given the large compliance costs, there is clearly scope to improve the system in respect of the demands on universities and academics in producing their evidence portfolios, the way in which these are evaluated, and the way funds are allocated. The debate on reforms to PBRF would also need to address issues raised by other commentators regarding, for example, the high administrative and compliance costs, the types of research supported, and incentives to work on contemporary NZ issues.
